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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/09/2003

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On October 8, 2003, [redacted] U.S.  
Postal Inspection Service and [redacted] U.S.  
Postal Inspection Service, interviewed [redacted] date  
of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] at [redacted]  
residence, [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone [redacted] cell phone [redacted] After  
being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the purpose  
of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] has lived in [redacted] since [redacted]  
[redacted] has lived at his current address for [redacted]  
[redacted] resides with [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] is a graduate of [redacted]  
[redacted] attended [redacted] University  
where [redacted] majored in [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted] began employment in [redacted] as a [redacted]  
[redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located at [redacted] Porter  
Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] duties involved [redacted]  
[redacted]

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Investigation on 10/08/03 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936USAMRIID/279A-BA-222936

Date dictated N/A

by [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936USAMRIID/279A-BA-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/08/03, Page 2

\_\_\_\_\_ role in \_\_\_\_\_ afforded \_\_\_\_\_ access to \_\_\_\_\_ never went into the \_\_\_\_\_ labs. \_\_\_\_\_ was located in Rooms \_\_\_\_\_ of Building \_\_\_\_\_. Other USAMRIID employees using this office space included \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ was the \_\_\_\_\_ predecessor as \_\_\_\_\_ is the current \_\_\_\_\_. Room \_\_\_\_\_ contained desks, file cabinets and a freezer. The freezer was used to temporarily store materials prior to and after irradiation. This freezer was not locked. The door to \_\_\_\_\_ had a key lock. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_ contained Beta and Gamma radiation counters, a chemical fume hood and a radiation calibrating instrument. Room \_\_\_\_\_ was \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ circled and initialed the locations of these rooms on a floor plan that has been included in the attached 1A envelope.

\_\_\_\_\_ had access to Room \_\_\_\_\_ in Building \_\_\_\_\_. A walk-in freezer/cooler is located within the room. No radioactive material is stored there. Anyone can walk into the room. \_\_\_\_\_ avoided walking into labs where people were working.

\_\_\_\_\_ involving infectious or non-infectious biological material. Within three days of beginning employment \_\_\_\_\_ was given samples containing Ebola virus \_\_\_\_\_. Samples containing infectious matter originating at USAMRIID were \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ received shipments of infectious material from sources outside of USAMRIID for irradiation at the shipping and receiving area of Building \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ received from the \_\_\_\_\_ various infectious materials \_\_\_\_\_. The material was received dry and wet and presented within varying types of containers. \_\_\_\_\_ never opened the containers. \_\_\_\_\_ to the material was \_\_\_\_\_ viable material in the sample. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ received various strains of anthrax \_\_\_\_\_ Bacillus anthracis (Ba) for BRUCE IVINS and \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall handling \_\_\_\_\_ Ba.

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/08/03, Page 3

\_\_\_\_\_ 350 to 400 ml solution of Ba that was received from \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall handling dry Ba.

A record was kept of all materials \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ The form was kept with the material \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ The information upon the form included, the name of the researcher, description of the material, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ information was also recorded in a log book maintained by the safety office. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ developed an interest in infectious materials incident to \_\_\_\_\_ work experience at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ knew of no one extremely interested in anthrax other than \_\_\_\_\_ recalled having a conversation with \_\_\_\_\_ regarding the \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ was intrigued that illness can occur with exposure to one shigella bacterium whereas exposure to ten thousand anthrax spores was necessary for illness to occur. \_\_\_\_\_ was surprised to learn that there were many strains of anthrax. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that techniques for drying anthrax were described in KEN ALIBECK's book (Biohazard). \_\_\_\_\_ recalled having discussions concerning accidental and intentional outbreaks of infectious disease with other employees at USAMRIID which was common among employees. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that someone suggested that a crop duster or truck exhaust may be used to spread infectious material. \_\_\_\_\_ could not recall who made that statement. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled stating, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ had this type of conversation with \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ does not recall anyone specifically discussing the subject of sending anthrax via the mail. \_\_\_\_\_ believes that anyone who worked at USAMRIID should do not be ruled out.

\_\_\_\_\_ recalled that \_\_\_\_\_ was involved \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ One member of the group was very negative to funding USAMRIID and preferred that the money

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/08/03, Page 4

be used for funding schools, housing or education. [ ] recalled that it was a female member of the group. [ ] does not recall the name of any of the [ ] of the tour. [ ] feels that it is important to fund researchers full time than rely on temporary contractors.

The news has reported that the anthrax in the mail came from USAMRIID. It would not have been hard to remove anthrax from USAMRIID. Biological agents may be removed from the hot areas by secreting them on your person and walking through the shower area without showering. Showering was not an OSHA requirement but was a USAMRIID requirement that [ ] was aware was not followed. Someone who has taken infectious material takes a chance of killing themselves. [ ] could not identify anyone that [ ] would suspect taking biological agents from USAMRIID. [ ] could not identify anyone, other than [ ] that would be considered by others to be a disgruntled employee of USAMRIID. [ ] is not aware of anyone who participated in unofficial work with Ba or its simulants. [ ] is not aware of anyone who "piggy-backed" into and out of the hot areas of USAMRIID.

[ ] recalled two incidents involving lax handling of dangerous items at USAMRIID. [ ] recalled two incidents involving unknown persons that occurred around [ ]. In one incident [ ] observed loose vials under locked freezers in the hallway near the [ ] suite of rooms. [ ] also recalled an incident involving vials that apparently fell into a freezer used to obtain dry ice. [ ] was not aware of any areas in USAMRIID that had problems with bacterial contamination. [ ] heard that there had been one after [ ] left USAMRIID involving a pass through associated with a hot suite.

[ ] does not know how to prepare anthrax for mailing. [ ] does not know what a lyophilizer is. [ ] does not have experience in forensic techniques. [ ] does not recall anyone who expressed a special interest in forensic techniques. [ ] recalled that the [ ] at USAMRIID has participated in forensic analysis. [ ] mentioned that they were involved in examining ricin bullets. [ ] does not have any personal or professional association with New Jersey and did not travel there in September or October of 2001.

[ ] described that the standard SOP for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets involved paraformaldehyde

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/08/03, Page 5

gas and a wipe down of surfaces with a bleach solution. Anthrax researchers use bleach solutions.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not recall seeing clear plastic containers at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ recalled using \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall what type of equipment \_\_\_\_\_ delivered.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not recall using pre-stamped postal envelopes or observing pre-stamped envelopes at USAMRIID. Personal mail cannot be mailed from USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ has not used the postal vending machines in Frederick, Maryland. \_\_\_\_\_ has not had contact with any of the anthrax-laced envelopes. \_\_\_\_\_ has not done any analytical work associated with this case.

\_\_\_\_\_ recalled that \_\_\_\_\_ continued to visit USAMRIID to assist \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ tried to schedule \_\_\_\_\_ visits so that \_\_\_\_\_ would not be in the building \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ met \_\_\_\_\_ at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ liked \_\_\_\_\_ and would be surprised if \_\_\_\_\_ had anything to do with the mailing of the anthrax laced letters. \_\_\_\_\_ described \_\_\_\_\_ as outgoing. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ recalled visiting \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_ office to discuss \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ to prepare them for shipment to \_\_\_\_\_ wanted to be certain that \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ observed a \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ computer screen. \_\_\_\_\_ told \_\_\_\_\_ that \_\_\_\_\_ had been contacted by \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ had other contact with \_\_\_\_\_ relative to \_\_\_\_\_ involvement in \_\_\_\_\_ at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ also recalled seeing \_\_\_\_\_ in the hallways of USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall observing \_\_\_\_\_ performing lab work at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ does not know where \_\_\_\_\_ stored \_\_\_\_\_ growth material. \_\_\_\_\_ never socialized with \_\_\_\_\_. The subject of anthrax was never discussed. \_\_\_\_\_ did not discuss his interest in infectious agents with \_\_\_\_\_

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/08/03, Page 6

never allowed \_\_\_\_\_ to "piggy-back" into any areas at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ has not discussed books and manuscripts with \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ never attended any \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ knows of no organization to which \_\_\_\_\_ belongs. \_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of any \_\_\_\_\_ may have had. \_\_\_\_\_ left USAMRIID without saying goodbye. \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall seeing \_\_\_\_\_ after \_\_\_\_\_ left USAMRIID. Some researchers do stay on to finish whatever they are doing. \_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of \_\_\_\_\_ removing equipment or anything else from USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of \_\_\_\_\_ moving equipment to other areas of USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ never observed \_\_\_\_\_ near the \_\_\_\_\_ or the \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ was surprised to hear, since \_\_\_\_\_ left USAMRIID, that \_\_\_\_\_ remembers \_\_\_\_\_ showed no interest in a \_\_\_\_\_ at USAMRIID that \_\_\_\_\_ told \_\_\_\_\_ about. \_\_\_\_\_ had used the \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ made no mention of \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ has no information to provide regarding scientists visiting USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ would be willing to participate in a polygraph examination associated with this case.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 11/03/2003

[redacted] born on [redacted] Social  
Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] of [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed  
at [redacted] residence. After being advised of the nature of the  
interview and the identity of the interviewing agents, provided the  
following information:

[redacted] obtained a [redacted] degree  
in [redacted] and a [redacted] degree in [redacted]  
[redacted] for [redacted] years while attending the UNIVERSITY OF  
[redacted] left the UNIVERSITY OF [redacted] to  
study [redacted] at the [redacted]  
where [redacted] obtained [redacted]

[redacted] worked in the [redacted]  
[redacted] for [redacted] years. During [redacted] time there, [redacted] worked on a  
[redacted] project to develop a [redacted]  
[redacted] for the [redacted]. The  
[redacted] for this  
contract had to be signed before [redacted] could officially begin  
[redacted] work. While waiting for the [redacted] [redacted] was  
authorised to work from home, which [redacted] did for three months. The  
[redacted] later assumed the  
responsibility of this project. After the [redacted]  
[redacted] began working at the UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID). [redacted]  
worked under the supervision of [redacted] [redacted] worked at  
USAMRIID for approximately [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted] worked only in the [redacted]  
[redacted] areas. [redacted] was provided floor plans from USAMRIID  
buildings. [redacted] indicated where [redacted] was located  
by sketching a map on the back of the plans, which has been  
enclosed in an attached 1A envelope.

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Investigation on 10/31/2003 at [redacted]  
File # 279A-WF-222936USAMRIID 297A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 11/03/2003  
by [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936USAMRIID 297A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/31/2003, Page 2

[REDACTED] had received vaccines for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked only with non-lethal *bacillus anthracis* (Ba). In conjunction with [REDACTED] which is located in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] worked on the development of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also worked on developing a Ba vaccine while at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] never worked with live Ba and never dried Ba.

[REDACTED] did not engage in any virology work. [REDACTED] worked with the [REDACTED] which is a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] never worked with smallpox, plague or ricin.

[REDACTED] did not know ~~BRUCE IVINS~~ or [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not have access to the hot suites. [REDACTED] could not recall anyone "piggybacking" through any doors but believes that if it did happen, it would only be a person recognized by others.

[REDACTED] never heard of anyone having bioweapons nor did [REDACTED] know anyone that held a hostile attitude towards the United States government or media. [REDACTED] has no suspicions of anyone that could have been responsible for the anthrax mailings.

[REDACTED] has no ties to Trenton or Princeton, New Jersey and has not traveled to New Jersey recently. [REDACTED] did recall that [REDACTED] was returning home from a trip [REDACTED] [REDACTED] spent the previous [REDACTED] [REDACTED] visiting with [REDACTED] family. [REDACTED] flew into Philadelphia International Airport. [REDACTED] during the months of the anthrax mailings and remained at home. [REDACTED] had been [REDACTED] since [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did maintain a notebook while working at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not recall where the notebook is but believes that it would have remained at USAMRIID after [REDACTED] left.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/31/2003, Page 3

[redacted] would be willing to undergo a polygraph examination if it were to take place near to or at [redacted] residence.

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Date of transcription 10/24/2003

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security number [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was  
interviewed at [redacted] place of business, the United States Army  
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort  
Detrick, Maryland, telephone number [redacted] After being  
advised the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of  
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is a [redacted] and has worked at  
USAMRIID since [redacted] was sent to [redacted]  
[redacted] and returned  
approximately [redacted] In [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] education includes [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted] has not worked with Bacillus anthracis (Ba)  
except for [redacted] hasn't done any work  
with live anthrax. [redacted] currently works in [redacted] in  
rooms [redacted] has worked on Ba projects doing  
clinical work and protocols under BRUCE IVINS or [redacted]  
[redacted] was not sure what strains were used.

The only individuals that [redacted] thought to have enough  
expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production and  
lyophilizing are IVINS, [redacted] and any scientist.

In [redacted] [redacted] worked in rooms [redacted]  
[redacted] stated that there were coolers in building [redacted]  
on the second floor. They housed reagents and specimens. [redacted]  
wasn't sure exactly what was stored in the coolers however, stated  
that it would be labeled. [redacted] was unsure of who used this  
cooler and assumed anyone with access to building [redacted] had access  
to the cooler. [redacted] does not know what a lyophilizer is.

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Investigation on 10/23/03 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/279A-BA-C101398

Date dictated N/A

by [redacted]

302-WPC

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/279A-BA-C101396

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/23/03, Page 2

Prior to 9/11/01, "piggy backing" happened a lot. Visiting scientists had gone into suites however, \_\_\_\_\_ did not know who they were with or what country they were from.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that if someone wanted to take something from USAMRIID, they could just walk off with it prior to the 9/11/01 time period.

\_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of any hostile individuals and does not suspect anyone of the anthrax mailings. Furthermore, \_\_\_\_\_ has not heard any rumors regarding any individual/s interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need.

\_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of how to weaponize Ba and has no forensic knowledge.

\_\_\_\_\_ has a \_\_\_\_\_ that lives in \_\_\_\_\_ has not been there since before 9/11/01 when he traveled \_\_\_\_\_

The SOP's for decontamination include paraformaldehyde and ammonia bicarbonate. \_\_\_\_\_ was not sure of the exact decon process and would have to read them. \_\_\_\_\_ hasn't been in \_\_\_\_\_ for \_\_\_\_\_ years. \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ would know the procedures.

\_\_\_\_\_ never noticed any plastic containers. \_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not keep a lab notebook and does not recall using pre-stamped envelopes. \_\_\_\_\_ never used any vending machines.

\_\_\_\_\_ had nothing to do with processing of the anthrax letters.

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\_\_\_\_\_ knew \_\_\_\_\_ on a professional level. \_\_\_\_\_ worked for \_\_\_\_\_ (FNU). \_\_\_\_\_ assumed that \_\_\_\_\_ was a research scientist working on \_\_\_\_\_ saw \_\_\_\_\_ in the hallways in building \_\_\_\_\_ however, never saw \_\_\_\_\_ in building \_\_\_\_\_

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/23/03, Page 3

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\_\_\_\_\_ recalled seeing \_\_\_\_\_ after \_\_\_\_\_ left USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ believed that \_\_\_\_\_ was unsure of this time period and the time period that \_\_\_\_\_ left USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ was unaware that \_\_\_\_\_ left until \_\_\_\_\_ saw \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_ never saw \_\_\_\_\_ "piggy back" into suites and never saw \_\_\_\_\_ take equipment. \_\_\_\_\_ never spoke about anthrax. \_\_\_\_\_ never saw \_\_\_\_\_ work with bacterial cultures. \_\_\_\_\_ assumed that \_\_\_\_\_ stored \_\_\_\_\_ samples of \_\_\_\_\_ work in \_\_\_\_\_ building \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_ never had any conversations with \_\_\_\_\_ regarding \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ never complained about anything. \_\_\_\_\_ never mentioned anthrax. \_\_\_\_\_ talked to \_\_\_\_\_ on one occasion about \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ is unaware of any connections \_\_\_\_\_ may have with New Jersey. \_\_\_\_\_ is unaware of any social connections of \_\_\_\_\_ to include \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ never hosted any foreign visitors.

\_\_\_\_\_ works \_\_\_\_\_ also works \_\_\_\_\_ supervisor is \_\_\_\_\_ works the majority of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ consented to a polygraph and is scheduled for \_\_\_\_\_ at 10:00 a.m.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 11/03/2003

On 10/30/2003, [redacted] (aka [redacted]  
[redacted] date of birth: [redacted] social security  
number: [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] home telephone number: [redacted] work phone  
number: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment:  
the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious  
Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised  
of the identity of the investigating agents and the purpose of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] currently employed at USAMRIID as [redacted]  
[redacted] and has held this  
position since [redacted] [redacted] has been working at USAMRIID since [redacted]  
[redacted] worked for [redacted]  
[redacted] returned to USAMRIID in  
[redacted]

[redacted] and is a [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] at USAMRIID  
but does not participate in [redacted]  
[redacted] has not been in the hot suites at USAMRIID  
since [redacted] but [redacted] is currently immunized.

[redacted] not grown or cultured *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba),  
[redacted] has only worked on studies related to the Ba vaccine. These  
studies [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] not know of anyone who may be an expert in  
weaponization techniques. [redacted] assumes BRUCE IVINS may know  
something about it as he interacts often with [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] the following names of individuals that had  
clearances and vaccines, but they did not all necessarily work in  
the hot side of the labs: [redacted] (phonetic) [redacted]  
[redacted]

Investigation on 10/30/2003 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C10192 Date dictated 11/03/03

SA [redacted]  
by [redacted]

file: [redacted] [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 179A-BA-C10192

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 10/30/2003, Page 2

[redacted] (phoenetic) who worked with [redacted]  
[redacted] (phonetic) [redacted] (phoenetic), [redacted] who  
worked with [redacted] and [redacted]  
(phonetic).

[redacted] was provided a floor plan of building [redacted] of  
USAMRIID on which [redacted] marked and initialed all areas that [redacted] has  
worked in. A copy of the floor plan is attached.

[redacted] worked occasionally on the [redacted] floor of building  
[redacted] in laboratories [redacted]. At times [redacted] worked in [redacted]  
[redacted] when those laboratories were used for studies on the [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] has never used the cold storage in room [redacted] of  
building [redacted]

[redacted] worked in the office spaces [redacted] and  
laboratories [redacted] on the [redacted] floor of  
building [redacted]

[redacted] never new anyone to piggy-back in or out of the hot  
suites.

[redacted] does not know how one could remove a select agent  
from the laboratories.

[redacted] does not know anyone to ever use a lyophilizer for  
drying live agents. [redacted] is not aware of ever using a lyohilizer in  
any of [redacted] work.

[redacted] is not aware of anyone who would want to remove a  
select agent or who would make one for use in an improper fashion.

[redacted] does not know of anyone who would be suspect in the  
mailings of the anthrax-laced letters.

[redacted] does not know of anyone with hostile views toward  
the government, specific politicians, the media, or others.

[redacted] does not know of anyone to having dried Ba.

[redacted] does not know of anyone with specific skills to  
avoid forensic techniques.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 179A-BA-C10192

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 10/30/2003, Page 3

[REDACTED] does not have any personal or professional affiliation with anyone in the Trenton or Princeton New Jersey area. [REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] may have family in New Jersey. [REDACTED] may also have relatives in the New Jersey area.

[REDACTED] is not sure of what the standard operation procedure for decontamination is.

[REDACTED] has never seen, nor used, plastic storage containers at USAMRIID, nor does [REDACTED] know where any may be kept.

All of [REDACTED] research and study performance notebooks are maintained [REDACTED] in room [REDACTED] of building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes nor has [REDACTED] ever used any of the vending machines in the Frederick, Maryland area to purchase postal products.

[REDACTED] did not see nor handle any of the anthrax-laced letters.

[REDACTED] has never known [REDACTED] did not know anything about [REDACTED] until after [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never sponsored any foreign visiting scientists.

[REDACTED] has never known any foreign visiting scientists to be allowed in the hot suites of USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] work hours are typically from [REDACTED] at about [REDACTED] leaves USAMRIID [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] may have been at [REDACTED] at least one of the weekends of the mailings of the anthrax-laced letters. [REDACTED] told investigators [REDACTED] would attempt to verify [REDACTED] whereabouts and provide any supporting documentation to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] denied having ever given anyone Ba.

[REDACTED] denied having anything to do with the preparation or mailing of the anthrax-laced letters.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 179A-BA-C10192

Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

, On 10/30/2003

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[REDACTED] was asked to take a polygraph examination. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had heard "bad things" about the polygraph examination, however [REDACTED] was willing to take the exam. [REDACTED] is scheduled to be examined on [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/24/2003

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On November 25, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] home  
address [redacted] home phone [redacted]  
[redacted] work telephone [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]  
place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street,  
Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted] attended [redacted] College in [redacted]  
[redacted] then attended [redacted] to  
become [redacted]  
[redacted]

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[redacted] is [redacted] and does not suite work  
whenever [redacted] The  
primary nature of [redacted] work is [redacted]  
[redacted] throughout the lab.  
During September 2001, [redacted] was at [redacted]  
[redacted] title at [redacted] was [redacted]  
[redacted] Since the start of [redacted] work at USAMRIID, the only  
work [redacted] has done relating to Anthrax is with a [redacted]  
[redacted] did not participate directly in the infection of the animals.  
[redacted] primary responsibility was [redacted]  
[redacted] These samples were not cultured by [redacted] The  
samples were handed off to lab techs or scientists who performed  
the cultures. [redacted] did not know what strain of *Bacillus anthracis*  
[redacted] was working with but [redacted] did know it was from [redacted]  
[redacted] This work was done in  
Building [redacted] at USAMRIID, where [redacted] did most of [redacted] work in  
2001. [redacted] worked with [redacted] and BRUCE IVINS but  
did not recall additional names of scientists with whom [redacted] worked.  
[redacted] occasionally spoke with [redacted] who was a scientist working  
in [redacted] about their common interest in [redacted]

[redacted] did not directly witness piggy backing of card  
access into hot suites. [redacted] did not work a lot during off hours.  
[redacted] worked after hours prior to September 11, 2001, but that was  
when [redacted] worked at [redacted] [redacted] never purchased pre-

328 [redacted] 01.302  
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b7C Investigation on 11/24/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-340

File # 279A-BA-C101392-1290

Date dictated 11/24/2003

SA [redacted]  
by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 11/24/2003, Page 2

stamped envelopes and never used the vending machines that sold them. [REDACTED] did not know of the existence of the postal vending machines at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did not know what was stored in the walk-in cooler in room [REDACTED] in Building [REDACTED] and never had any reason to enter the cooler. [REDACTED] does not know what bacterial contamination smells like and never noticed any decontamination agents being used in any suites to counteract contamination.

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] but knew of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] recognized [REDACTED] but did not recognize the name alone. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] in rooms [REDACTED] in Building [REDACTED] [REDACTED] never directly interacted with [REDACTED] and never discussed [REDACTED] with anyone else who worked in the lab. [REDACTED] works at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] is responsible for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] was not sure of [REDACTED] relationship with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] worked at USAMRIID in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not speak to [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] except to acknowledge having seen the [REDACTED] and knowing the individual who was the [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 11/26/2003

On 11/24/2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security number [redacted] address [redacted]  
[redacted] home phone [redacted] was  
interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation offices, [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] provided the following overview of [redacted] educational  
and career experience:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Graduated with [redacted]  
[redacted] Degree in [redacted]  
from [redacted]

[redacted]

Living and working in [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted]

University of [redacted]  
Pursuing a [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] noted that during [redacted] at [redacted]  
was employed on a part-time basis with the [redacted]  
[redacted] located in [redacted]  
[redacted] direct supervisor at [redacted] was [redacted] in the [redacted]  
[redacted] While at [redacted] [redacted] worked on various projects involving  
[redacted]

[redacted] stated that during [redacted]  
[redacted] was asked to work for [redacted]  
[redacted] of USAMRIID on a project to [redacted]  
[redacted] This project was very  
similar to what [redacted] had been working on at [redacted] [redacted] direct  
supervisor while at USAMRIID during [redacted] was [redacted]

Investigation on 11/24/2003 at [redacted]  
File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 7170 Date dictated n/a  
by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003 , Page 2

[REDACTED] characterized [REDACTED] position at USAMRIID as [REDACTED] and although primarily assigned to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] he [REDACTED] was also assigned [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] never worked with any form of anthrax while at USAMRIID and only worked in a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] suite a few times, always accompanied by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] remembers being issued a key card for access into the [REDACTED] suite at USAMRIID.

SA [REDACTED] then asked [REDACTED] the relevant questions provided by WFO for interview purposes.

If never interviewed:

1. Obtain details on education, specializations, nature of work at each laboratory of employment; details on work with biological organisms (particularly *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba)).

Answer: Covered above

2. Determine whether any work with Ba was on the living organism or only with components such as toxin, DNA, etc.

Answer: [REDACTED] has never worked with any form of anthrax

3. Obtain details on all projects involving Ba including identification of contracts, subcontractors, lab assistants, whether the work involved spores or just vegetative cells, strains used, specifically how the Ba was grown, storage technique and all storage locations, distribution to any other researchers.

Answer: [REDACTED] has never worked with any form of anthrax

4. Have you ever used the modified G sporulation media? When, on what organism and strain, where was it stored?

Answer: [REDACTED] has never worked with any form of anthrax or anthrax created using the modified G sporulation media

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003 , Page 3

5. What type of culture technique did you use? Was it single colony or multiple colony culture technique? If you used both, what time-frames did you use each?

Answer: [REDACTED] has never worked with any form of anthrax

6. Identify any work involving the drying of Ba. Was a lyophilizer used? What was the specific technique? Are any samples of dried Ba still maintained? Were high resolution images collected?

Answer: [REDACTED] has used a lyophilizer in the past on various projects involving plague but never anthrax

7. Were the strains used fully characterized? Where did they originate, and where have they been disseminated? If the strain was Ames, did it come from Bruce Ivins or [REDACTED]

Answer: [REDACTED] has never worked with any form of anthrax

8. Identify any persons who have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, lyophilizing. Is there anyone else we should talk to about the above issues?

Answer: [REDACTED] does not know of any individuals with the above listed expertise

9. Identify any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination, particularly virology suites.

Answer: [REDACTED] never heard about any issues of bacterial cross contamination.

10. Identify the areas routinely used by the employee (use floor plans).

Answer: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was unable to specifically identify [REDACTED]  
lab on the blueprints provided by WFO.

11. Determine if the person used the hot areas of building [REDACTED] Was the walk-in cooler, room [REDACTED] used? Who was

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279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003 , Page 4

observed using the walk-in cooler? Do you know what was stored there?

Answer: [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] conducted while at USAMRIID (approximately [REDACTED] times total) was done in the [REDACTED] laboratory building, never in building [REDACTED]

12. Did people "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas at USAMRIID? Were visiting scientists taken into the hot areas by USAMRIID researchers?

Answer: [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] cannot remember ever witnessing anyone "piggybacking" into the [REDACTED] area at USAMRIID.

13. How could someone remove Select Agents from the hot areas covertly? Identify any individuals who attempted this.

Answer: [REDACTED] believes that it would be "pretty easy" to remove select agents from the [REDACTED] suites at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that someone could conceal an agar plate or a small vial under in the armpit area long enough to get through the "shower-in/shower-out" process covertly. [REDACTED] does not know of any individuals who ever attempted to remove select agents from a [REDACTED] lab.

14. Are you aware of anyone who said they might make a Select Agent for use in some improper fashion?

Answer: No

15. Are you aware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others?

Answer: No

16. Are there any persons you believe to be or suspect of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters? Who and why?

Answer: No

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003 , Page 5

17. Are there any people with whom you have worked who were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents?

Answer: No

18. Was there anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so?

Answer: No

19. How would you go about preparing dried Ba and sending it through the mail?

Answer: [REDACTED] believes that it would be pretty tough to prepare dried Ba and put it in the mail. [REDACTED] does not know how someone would find out what powder to link to the Ba spores to induce aerosolization. [REDACTED] does not believe that simply opening an envelope would be enough energy to disperse the dried anthrax. [REDACTED] believes that you would need to pressurize the envelope in some manner to ensure proper dispersal.

20. Are you aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques?

Answer: No

21. Do you or any of your associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or other areas of New Jersey?

Answer: No

22. Did you or any of your associates travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001? Do you recall where you were during that time period?

Answer: [REDACTED] does not believe [REDACTED] has ever been in New Jersey and believes [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED] during the specified time frame.

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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 11/24/2003 , Page 6

23. Are there SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets in your work areas? What are they?

Answer:  does not know if USAMRIID has any SOPs for the decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets.

24. Has paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation been employed in the virology areas? When?

Answer:  has no knowledge of this process.

25. Have you ever smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the virology suites?

Answer: No

26. Have you ever used plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, for storage of your materials at USAMRIID? If so, how, where and when were they purchased? By whom? Did you ever notice any such storage boxes missing?

Answer: No

27. Are you aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded?

Answer: No

28. Was all of your work recorded in lab notebooks? Where are they stored?

Answer:  stated that all of  work was recorded in a lab book and  would assume the lab book is in  possession.

29. Did you ever purchase pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for your own use or for anyone else? If so, did you ever give them to anyone else? Where were the envelopes stored?

Answer: No

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 11/24/2003, Page 7

30. Did you ever use any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes? If so, which machine and when?

Answer: No

31. Did you personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes? If so, when, what rooms, who else was present?

Answer: No

32. Did you do any analytical work on the evidence in this case? Get details.

Answer: No

Questions regarding [redacted]

[redacted] did not recognize [redacted] name as anyone [redacted] remembers from [redacted] at USAMRIID during [redacted] SA [redacted] showed [redacted] a color photograph of [redacted] in an attempt to jog [redacted] memory. After viewing the photograph for several seconds, [redacted] stated that [redacted] has never met [redacted] and does not believe [redacted] ever saw [redacted] at USAMRIID. Therefore all of the [redacted] associated questions, other than the one listed below, were not asked of [redacted]

26. Is there anything we have not asked you that you could tell us which could be related to the anthrax letter mailings?

Answer: No

If interviewee hosted foreign visiting scientists:

[redacted] stated that [redacted] never hosted a foreign visiting scientist while working at USAMRIID during [redacted] Therefore the listed questions were not asked of [redacted]

If interviewee was [redacted] member:

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 11/24/2003, Page 8

[REDACTED] was not [REDACTED] member  
while working at USAMRIID during [REDACTED] Therefore the  
listed questions were not asked of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] can be described as follows:

Sex:	[REDACTED]
Race:	[REDACTED]
Height:	Approx. [REDACTED]
Weight:	Approx. [REDACTED]
Hair:	[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/2/2003

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To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

AMX 3,

Contact: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-POI (Pending)-901  
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 388

Title: AMERITHRAX;  
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Report results of the investigation regarding [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Details: An investigation of [REDACTED] commenced because [REDACTED] had access to locations where the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) was stored at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland.

[REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] with  
Social Security Account Number [REDACTED] home address [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] home telephone number.  
[REDACTED] is a USAMRIID [REDACTED] employee working as the  
[REDACTED] in the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] started at USAMRIID [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] in [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

has held the same basic position that [REDACTED] started in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] earned [REDACTED] Degree in [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 12/2/2003

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[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
at USAMRIID. The machines are located in rooms [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] BRUCE IVINS and [redacted]  
provided the anthrax spores to the [redacted] to infect  
the non-human primates.

A time-line of [redacted] activities for the likely  
periods of the mailing of the anthrax letters from Princeton, New  
Jersey was compiled using USAMRIID Key Card Access records,  
telephone call records and credit card records. The time-line  
focused on any six-hour period for which [redacted] would be  
unaccounted, with the premise that [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

Telephone toll records documented that telephone number  
[redacted] was registered in the name of [redacted]  
The telephone is a household telephone, and toll records do not  
indicate who specifically made the telephone calls.

Reviews of [redacted] financial records and home telephone  
records for the year 2001 revealed no connections to New Jersey.  
However, [redacted] personal bank accounts are with [redacted]  
[redacted] The account is exclusively in [redacted] name  
with [redacted] as the designated [redacted]  
accounts with [redacted] had a balance of approximately [redacted] as of  
the mailing period. In addition, [redacted]  
[redacted] documented [redacted] deposits in  
[redacted] by [redacted] using [redacted] Social Security  
Account Number. The deposits were listed for [redacted]  
[redacted]

Time-line First Mailing (5:00 p.m., 9/17/01 through  
8:00 p.m., 9/18/01)

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 12/2/2003

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USAMRIID Facility Key Card Access records documented that [ ] entered Building [ ] on 9/17/01 at [ ] and remained at work until [ ] exit at [ ]. The longest period between key card activity during work hours for which [ ] was unaccounted on 9/17/01 was approximately [ ] hours and [ ] minutes.

After exiting USAMRIID on 9/17/01, [ ] is unaccounted for during a period of [ ] hours and [ ] minutes until [ ] badged in again on 9/18/01 at [ ]. [ ] exited Building [ ] on 9/18/01 at [ ]. The longest period between key card activity during work hours for which [ ] is unaccounted for on 9/18/01 was approximately [ ] hours and [ ] minutes.

A review of telephone toll records showed a telephone call to [ ] on 9/17/01 at 7:06 PM.

A review of [ ] credit card transactions and [ ] Bank Records indicated no purchases during this time frame.

**Time-line Second Mailing (3:00 p.m., 10/06/01 through 11:00 a.m., 10/09/01)**

USAMRIID Facility Key Card Access records documented that [ ] entered Building [ ] on 10/6/01 at [ ] and remained at work until [ ]. On the same day, [ ] telephone toll records documented a call from [ ] residence to [ ] at [ ]. [ ] credit card records documented a purchase at [ ] in [ ] on 10/6/01.

USAMRIID Key Card Access records documented that [ ] first entered USAMRIID on 10/7/01 at [ ]. [ ] remained at work on 10/7/01 until [ ]. There were approximately 20 hours and 36 minutes for which [ ] was unaccounted between 10/6/01 at [ ] PM and 10/7/01 at [ ].

[ ] telephone toll records documented the following calls from [ ] residence on 10/7/01:

Telephone call to [ ] at 11:52 AM;  
Telephone call to [ ] at 11:53 AM.

[ ] credit card records documented a purchase on 10/7/01 at the [ ] in [ ].

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 12/2/2003

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USAMRIID Key Card Access records documented [ ] entering USAMRIID on 10/8/01 at [ ] [ ] is unaccounted for during a period of approximately 18 hours and 16 minutes from 10/17/01 at [ ] to 10/8/01 at [ ] [ ] remained at USAMRIID on 10/8/01 until [ ] The longest period between key card activities on 10/8/01 was approximately 2 hours and 5 minutes.

[ ] is again unaccounted for during a period of approximately 10 hours and 45 minutes from 10/8/01 at [ ] PM until [ ] is recorded entering USMARIID on 10/9/01 at [ ] where [ ] remained until [ ] During work hours on 10/9/03, the longest period of time between key card activity was approximately 3 hours and 52 minutes.

**Additional Information:**

[ ] has been interviewed on at least [ ] occasions concerning this investigation and has been cooperative and forthcoming with investigators.

On [ ] voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination concerning the anthrax mailings. The result of the examination was not indicative of deception.

In addition to the findings presented above and the fact that [ ] has cooperated with this investigation, no direct, testimonial or circumstantial evidence has been discovered to date which suggests that [ ] may have been involved in the anthrax-laced letter mailings. Unless or until such evidence is identified, no further investigation of [ ] is intended in this case.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 10/30/2003

On 10/29/03, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] home phone: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence [redacted] by Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation and [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the investigating agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is currently employed at [redacted] conducting [redacted] studies to [redacted] [redacted] has been employed full-time at [redacted] since [redacted] and works primarily Monday through Friday, [redacted]

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[redacted] worked [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland starting in [redacted] as a [redacted] under [redacted] worked primarily in [redacted] in building [redacted] of USAMRIID. [redacted] did not have the [redacted] to enter building [redacted] during this time period.

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[redacted] provided the following names of co-workers with whom [redacted] worked [redacted] at USAMRIID: [redacted]

[redacted] did not know any anthrax researchers during this time period.

[redacted] went to [redacted] and worked as an [redacted] until [redacted]

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YN/

Investigation on 10/29/03 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 10/30/03

SSA [redacted]  
by [redacted]

File: [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/29/03, Page 2

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was at USAMRIID working as an investigator at the time.

[REDACTED] returned to Fort Detrick for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked full time as a [REDACTED] assigned primarily to the [REDACTED] Division until [REDACTED] full access to USAMRIID did not expire until [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided the names of individuals with whom [REDACTED] worked during the [REDACTED] time frame as follows: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
The only bacterial researchers and investigators that [REDACTED] knew were [REDACTED] and PERRY MIKESELL (deceased).

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] work at USAMRIID was exclusively with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Biological agents used for investigations were always prepared by the investigators [REDACTED] did not work with aerosol studies.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Primate necropsies were usually performed by pathologists.

[REDACTED] did work with investigators BRUCE IVINS and [REDACTED] conducting studies on Bacillus anthracis (Ba), however [REDACTED] never did swabbing or streaking of agar plates nor did [REDACTED] participate in or understand the culturing or growing process.

[REDACTED] believes all Ba samples would have originated with BRUCE IVINS.

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/29/03, Page 3

\_\_\_\_\_ did not know anyone to dry Ba nor did \_\_\_\_\_ know what a lyophilizer was.

No one ever expressed an interest in weaponization of biological agents to \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ does not recall there being bacterial contamination in the \_\_\_\_\_ areas of \_\_\_\_\_

During \_\_\_\_\_ at USAMRIID, \_\_\_\_\_ worked in building \_\_\_\_\_ suites \_\_\_\_\_ relative to \_\_\_\_\_ investigations. \_\_\_\_\_ also frequented \_\_\_\_\_ rooms \_\_\_\_\_ worked in all \_\_\_\_\_ rooms \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_ floor of building \_\_\_\_\_ also worked in the \_\_\_\_\_ where \_\_\_\_\_ investigations were conducted.

\_\_\_\_\_ never used the cooler in room \_\_\_\_\_ of building \_\_\_\_\_ could not recall spending any time in room \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ also worked in \_\_\_\_\_ labs of building \_\_\_\_\_ conducting \_\_\_\_\_ in labs \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ was provided a map of buildings \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ marked and initialed all areas in which \_\_\_\_\_ worked while employed at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that "piggy-backing" in and out of the hot areas was frequent.

\_\_\_\_\_ was not sure if visiting scientists had access to the hot areas.

Removing a biological agent would not be difficult. One could shower out with it on one's person or use the pass box. \_\_\_\_\_ said "ice cream containers", small cardboard containers often used in the labs, could be used to carry out an agent by passing it through an ultraviolet light making the outside safe, however the inside of the container could still remain hot.

\_\_\_\_\_ felt that safety regulations were slack at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ last name \_\_\_\_\_ (phonetic) in the \_\_\_\_\_

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/29/03, Page 4

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ does not know anyone with interests in obtaining dangerous items nor was anyone interested in gaining access to specific agents.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not know of anyone who had hostile attitudes toward the government, politicians, the media or others.

\_\_\_\_\_ never knew of any equipment to be missing from USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ has no knowledge of how to prepare dried Ba and send it in the mail.

None of \_\_\_\_\_ family or associates traveled to New Jersey in September or October of 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not know of any work to be done "off the books" at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not ever purchase mail products from vending machines in Frederick, Maryland nor has \_\_\_\_\_ ever purchased franked envelopes.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not know \_\_\_\_\_ prior to \_\_\_\_\_ the anthrax mailings. \_\_\_\_\_ did not host any foreign visitors to USAMRIID while \_\_\_\_\_ was employed there.

\_\_\_\_\_ recalled that \_\_\_\_\_ attended \_\_\_\_\_ around the time of the first mailing in September 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_ provided \_\_\_\_\_ email addresses; \_\_\_\_\_ has internet access at work. \_\_\_\_\_ does not use the computer located at \_\_\_\_\_ residence.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that key card access is recorded in and out of \_\_\_\_\_. In the labs there is \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ is the contact for said records.

\_\_\_\_\_ uses a \_\_\_\_\_ for fuel purchases.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/29/03, Page 5

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] for the mailings of the anthrax-laced letters and  
will provide the information to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] agreed to look for information that would show [REDACTED]  
was home during the periods of the anthrax mailings and provide  
said documentation to investigators.

[REDACTED] agreed to take a polygraph exam on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Attached hereto and considered part of this document is a  
copy of the floor plans of USAMRIID provided to [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 11/24/2003

[redacted]  
[redacted] Date of Birth: [redacted]  
[redacted] Social Security Number: [redacted] Address: [redacted]  
[redacted] Telephone Number: [redacted]  
[redacted] Employed as: [redacted]  
[redacted] Telephone Number: [redacted] was interviewed  
at the [redacted] Upon being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agent, and the nature of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted]  
[redacted] for the United States Army  
Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), in  
[redacted]

[redacted] was introduced to [redacted] by [redacted]  
[redacted] has always been  
skeptical about [redacted] Any questions, relating to [redacted]  
duties, titles, responsibilities, etc., [redacted]  
[redacted] The overall belief was that [redacted] was a  
[redacted] After not receiving any definitive information on  
[redacted]

Opinion wise, no one knew anything about [redacted]  
Impression wise, [redacted] was known as a [redacted]  
[redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted]  
[redacted] also told [redacted] about a trip that  
took to [redacted]

The purpose of this trip, according to [redacted] was to  
[redacted] is not  
sure why [redacted] went on this trip with [redacted]  
[redacted] bragged to [redacted] that [redacted] had a [redacted] as  
well as [redacted] installed in [redacted] car.

11/24/2003 [redacted]

Investigation on  
279A-WF-222936-LEAD at 379  
File # LUSAMRIID-370  
SA [redacted]  
by

11/24/2003

Date dictated

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Continuation of FD-302 of

On 11/24/2003, Page 2

remembers that

During [redacted] duty at USAMRIID, [redacted] was never [redacted]. In [redacted] prior to [redacted] time with the [redacted] was alerted to [redacted]. The [redacted] was alerted to [redacted] being the [redacted] at that time, was in charge of the [redacted].

from [REDACTED] holds a [REDACTED] University.

from		University.
------	--	-------------

holds an [redacted] from [redacted] College, and  
from the University [redacted]  
specializes in [redacted]

you consider [redacted] work at USAMRIID. [redacted] stated that [redacted] unless at USAMRIID involved working at [redacted] duties

only experience with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba).  
spores, vegetative cells, and storage, is [redacted]

All of		work was on
--------	--	-------------

both [redacted] and [redacted] personnel, inasmuch as these individuals [redacted] The vaccines received by these individuals assured their immuniginisity to work in the laboratory environment.

advised that

has no experience with the modified G sporulation media.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003 , Page 3

[REDACTED] has studied "Unclassified" literature on the drying of Ba. According to [REDACTED] the procedures for processing and weaponizing Ba are classified. [REDACTED] knows that Ba spores need to be between 2 to 5 microns, in order for them to be able to be inhaled and remain in the pulmonary system. [REDACTED] also knows that the spores need to be charged so that they repel each other. This charge allows the spores to remain aerosolized.

To the best of [REDACTED] knowledge, dried Ba is still maintained at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] has read about the testing of primates at USAMRIID. This testing would have to involve Ba that is maintained at USAMRIID. Based upon [REDACTED] readings, Ba originally came from the USDA, around 1950. The Ames strain is the main strain of Ba. This strain was eventually applied to the weapons program. As far as [REDACTED] knows, each strain can be traced back to its origin. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of USAMRIID ever farming/disseminating strains. [REDACTED] does not know BRUCE IVINS, or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are the individuals that [REDACTED] knows to be experts in weaponizing Ba. [REDACTED] who spoke at various USAMRIID courses, also spoke at the USAMRIID Medical Management of Chemical/Biological Casualties Course. After talking down about USAMRIID, [REDACTED] was never invited back. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has an article that pertains to the first meeting between [REDACTED]. The article talks about the weather and "what a great time to release whatever." The article does not talk about the manufacturing process, just the optimal time to release certain agents. This is an article that was authored by [REDACTED] near the end of the United States offensive biological program.

[REDACTED] worked on the "offensive" side of the weaponization program. USAMRIID is part of the "defensive" side of the weaponization program. USAMRIID also works with Aberdeen Proving Ground, for the design and production of Chemical/Biological masks.

During [REDACTED] time at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] recalls one instance where there was an accidental release of Ba. This release coincided with the visit of a Senator from New Orleans. The Senator was touring USAMRIID at the time of the release. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003, Page 4

[REDACTED] is not sure of the date/time period of this release. The Ba release happened inside the "hot area." To the best of [REDACTED] knowledge, [REDACTED] remembers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was provided with a set of floor plans for USAMRIID. The rooms marked with an "X" are areas that [REDACTED] has worked in.

[REDACTED]  
The first time was for a tour, and the second time was during the accidental Ba release. According to [REDACTED] the cooler, room [REDACTED] is still being used. [REDACTED] as well as [REDACTED] have all been in the cooler at one time or another. [REDACTED] along with various enlisted personnel.

"Piggy Backing" in the "hot area" did not occur. Having said that, there was a problem with all of the other entrances. The problem involved instances where several employees would enter the facility, after only one person was granted access. To gain access to the "hot area," one must be wearing the "blue chemical suit." Visiting scientists, as well as visitors, by protocol, must have all of their vaccines prior to entering the "hot area." Even though it is unlikely, it is possible for a visitor to gain access to the "hot area."

[REDACTED] between 1996 and 1999, CID investigated a matter where USAMRIID soldiers manufactured illicit drugs. These soldiers used a "hot suite" as their laboratory. [REDACTED] is not sure how they got their drugs out of the "hot area." [REDACTED] stated, "If they can get their drugs out of there, that may be something that you want to look into." [REDACTED] also said, "I am sure that someone can sneak something out if they want to." [REDACTED] does not recall seeing any sensors, nor any security measures, in place to detect the removal of biological/chemical agents from USAMRIID. No one was ever "frisked" while entering or leaving USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who expressed a desire to make a Select Agent for use in an improper fashion; nor is [REDACTED] aware of anyone with access and ability, who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003, Page 5

[REDACTED] does not suspect anyone to be the culprit of mailing the Anthrax letters.

Pre-September 11, 2001, [REDACTED] recalls an incident where a foreign scientist, from New York, took a vial of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis. This scientist took the vial to New York, after being administered the vaccine. [REDACTED] believes that this scientist was from a Middle Eastern country. CID tracked the scientist down and recovered the vial. This scientist no longer has access to USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that the FBI investigated this matter as well.

[REDACTED] traveled to [REDACTED] to attend the [REDACTED]. This is a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] There were no SOP's for decontamination within the [REDACTED] of USAMRIID. Paraformaldehyde is used to defumigate the rooms within [REDACTED] areas. [REDACTED] and was removed from the [REDACTED] area. This procedure was never needed while [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] has never used plastic storage containers, such as sterile boxes, for storage of materials at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] is not aware of any unrecorded/unofficial work with Ba. During [REDACTED] time at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] remembers a group that worked on new vaccines for Ba. All of [REDACTED] work is recorded in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes, nor has [REDACTED] ever purchased the pre-stamped envelopes from the vending machines in Frederick. [REDACTED] has never handled any of the Anthrax-laced letters or envelopes.

[REDACTED] the letter(s) sent to office of Senator Daschle. Once the letters were determined to be weaponized-Anthrax, [REDACTED] performed screening duties on the USAMRIID personnel that examined the envelopes.

[REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] prior to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] remembers seeing [REDACTED] inside USAMRIID, on three occasions. [REDACTED] remembers seeing [REDACTED] walking around the halls of USAMRIID, unescorted, in the hallway between the [REDACTED] series and [REDACTED] series of offices. All three times that [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 11/24/2003, Page 6

saw [REDACTED] was no longer with employed by USAMRIID.  
[REDACTED] does not recall seeing [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never allowed [REDACTED] to "piggy back." [REDACTED] has never witnessed [REDACTED] take any equipment, nor has [REDACTED] seen [REDACTED] move any equipment around USAMRIID.

Typically, when a scientist comes to USAMRIID, he or she is assigned for one specific task, or to work on one agent. From what [REDACTED] could gather, [REDACTED] never witnessed, nor heard about, [REDACTED] working with cultures, nor lyophilizers [REDACTED] would have to work in the laboratory in order to work with cultures.

[REDACTED] has never seen [REDACTED] near the walk in cooler, room [REDACTED] in the "hot area" of building [REDACTED]. The only time that [REDACTED] went to the cooler was to assist with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was not an employee of USAMRIID; therefore, [REDACTED] had no reason to be in the cooler. [REDACTED] never asked [REDACTED] for access to any isolates, equipment, or access to other areas of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not know where [REDACTED] ever stored any of [REDACTED] materials or samples. [REDACTED] never heard of any rumors that [REDACTED] brought in samples from [REDACTED]

According to [REDACTED] it was rumored that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] is not sure whether this is true or not. [REDACTED] never discussed [REDACTED] relationships with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has a note that [REDACTED] wrote to [REDACTED]. This note is written on an article that [REDACTED] received from [REDACTED]. The note says, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] agreed to provide this article to the writer.

[REDACTED] has never heard [REDACTED] talk about [REDACTED] political issues, or any issues involving [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that the FBI should talk to [REDACTED] if they want to know about what [REDACTED] has said about scenarios involving the production and use of bioweapons. According to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is unfamiliar with any reference to [REDACTED] nor any connections between [REDACTED] and New Jersey.

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\_\_\_\_\_ has never spent any social time with \_\_\_\_\_. According to \_\_\_\_\_ to the point of hanging out with \_\_\_\_\_ on a social basis. \_\_\_\_\_ only knows about the trip(s) that \_\_\_\_\_ took to \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ believes that \_\_\_\_\_ had a way of getting things at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ describes \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ has never hosted a foreign scientist. However, in \_\_\_\_\_ did host an individual by the name of \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ according to \_\_\_\_\_ is the sole, \_\_\_\_\_ invited \_\_\_\_\_ to visit \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ went through the proper protocol in order to bring \_\_\_\_\_ to USAMRIID. At no time did \_\_\_\_\_ ever enter any "hot areas" at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ was only allowed access to Ward \_\_\_\_\_ and was under strict control at all times. \_\_\_\_\_ was under constant supervision by \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ is mentioned in the article that \_\_\_\_\_ provided the interviewing agent.

\_\_\_\_\_ also worked with \_\_\_\_\_ while \_\_\_\_\_ worked on the \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ believes that \_\_\_\_\_ is still working at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ never requested to see, was never allowed to see, nor did \_\_\_\_\_ show any interest in Ba. \_\_\_\_\_ was shown a floor plan of USAMRIID and asked to circle each office that \_\_\_\_\_ was in.

\_\_\_\_\_ never purchased, nor otherwise obtained any pre-stamped envelopes while at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ never showed any anti-American sentiments during his visit to USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ never spent any time with the members of \_\_\_\_\_ while \_\_\_\_\_. Prior to that, it was common knowledge that \_\_\_\_\_ spent time with \_\_\_\_\_. It was rumored that \_\_\_\_\_ was involved in the \_\_\_\_\_. According to \_\_\_\_\_ was never properly set up through proper channels; therefore, prior to September 11, 2001, \_\_\_\_\_. When \_\_\_\_\_ first arrived at USAMRIID, USAMRIID was trying to work a special deal with \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ believes that part of the deal was for \_\_\_\_\_.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/24/2003, Page 8

[REDACTED] heard rumors that [REDACTED] had many connections with [REDACTED]. It was also rumored that the [REDACTED] had a lot of money. Apparently, USAMRIID is no longer funded this way. USAMRIID is now funded through proper military channels.

[REDACTED] has never attended any class, conference, or course, where [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] are the best sources of information on [REDACTED] who is now in [REDACTED] was on the [REDACTED] prior to [REDACTED] arriving at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] is the former [REDACTED]

After September 11, 2001, the Physicians Assistant (PA) to the White House contacted USAMRIID reference concerns about Anthrax attacks. [REDACTED] The PA was looking for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is now a [REDACTED] and is possibly still at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] recommends that the FBI speak with [REDACTED] about the [REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] was being considered for a position as [REDACTED] was the former [REDACTED] knows that [REDACTED] It is possible that [REDACTED] accompanied [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED] did not get the [REDACTED] position. [REDACTED] has seen photographs of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] agreed to provide the interviewing agent the article on the offensive side of the Botulinum toxin. This is the same article that has the [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 12/12/2003

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] current position is a [redacted]  
[redacted] duties are to [redacted]

[redacted] have access to *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.). [redacted] use both agar and broth to grow B.a. Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) is used most often as the agar growth medium, and sometimes New Sporulation Media (NSM) is also used, but not very often. [redacted] was unsure whether Modified G media is used. [redacted] believes that [redacted] would have laboratory notebooks that would answer that question. Both single colony and multiple colony culturing techniques have been used depending on the type of experiments. [redacted] guesses that for the culturing of the Ames strain, multiple colony culturing was utilized.

[redacted] first worked with B.a. during [redacted]  
[redacted] During the first Gulf War in the 1990's, work with the Ames strain of B.a. increased as it was used as the test strain in the laboratory. [redacted] has worked with, and continues to work with, live B.a. spores, but [redacted] has never produced a powdered form of anthrax. [redacted] believes that it would not be difficult to produce powdered B.a. One would simply culture it and dry it using a lyophilizer, and then mill it until it turns into a powder. [redacted] has traced the geneology of the Ames strain that [redacted] has [redacted] back to BRUCE IVINS.

Investigation on 12/12/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 1299 N/A

SA [redacted]  
by SA [redacted]



302


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BACK

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b6 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392  
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 12/12/2003, Page 2

During [REDACTED] was often in the "hot" suites in Building [REDACTED]. In recent years, [REDACTED] has not been in the "hot" suites very much. The B.a. used in [REDACTED] laboratory is stored in the [REDACTED] suite. [REDACTED] has never used plastic sterilite containers in USAMRIID. The research conducted by [REDACTED] was recorded in notebooks which are either stored in [REDACTED] or USAMRIID's library.

[REDACTED] believes that it would be very easy for anybody with access to the "hot" suites to obtain samples of anthrax or other kinds of agents. Anyone with the intent to steal it would only need to put a few spores under the fingernails, on the earlobe, or any other part of the body. Even if USAMRIID conducted security checks on people leaving the building, the spores would never be detected. As long as there are no open wounds in the area of the body that the spores are stored, the perpetrator would not be adversely affected.

b6 [REDACTED] numerous foreign visiting  
b7C scientists through the years. Records of these visits are kept at  
b7D the front office of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] recalls that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was a foreign visitor from [REDACTED] who had access to the  
"hot" suites without the need for an escort. [REDACTED] perused  
through [REDACTED] folder which was kept in [REDACTED] filing cabinet,  
and told the Agents that [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID in [REDACTED]  
for approximately [REDACTED] or slightly more than [REDACTED]  
worked on [REDACTED] and seeing the  
differences between [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] did express an interest in obtaining the Ames  
strain and a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] However, the agreement was never finalized and  
[REDACTED] is currently in the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6 Another foreign visiting scientist who did not require an  
b7C escort was [REDACTED] (last name unknown: LNU). [REDACTED] does not  
believe that [REDACTED] LNU was in the hot suites. [REDACTED] does not  
recall any other scientist who showed a special interest in the  
Ames strain. [REDACTED] has never noticed anybody in the  
laboratory or the "hot" suites that didn't belong or that might  
have aroused [REDACTED] suspicions.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 12/12/2003, Page 3

[REDACTED] has never been a member of the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] nor has [REDACTED] ever spent time with people who  
were part of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has spoken with [REDACTED] only once  
or twice. [REDACTED] specialty was [REDACTED]  
spoke with [REDACTED] about the possibility of looking at  
different [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] does not know anything  
about whether [REDACTED] kept [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] also did not have any knowledge  
of a pulmonary anthrax sample taken from a [REDACTED] patient that  
is purported to have been received by USAMRIID in the early 1990's.  
[REDACTED] has never spoken with [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] expertise or  
knowledge of anthrax.

[REDACTED] does not remember [REDACTED] or a  
[REDACTED] project in the late 1990's.

Other than a trip in [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] has never stayed in New  
Jersey. [REDACTED] has driven through the state to get to New York, but  
has never stopped in New Jersey. During the week after September  
11, 2001, [REDACTED] remembers being in the Frederick, Maryland  
area. In October 2001, [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was asked whether [REDACTED] would agree to take a  
polygraph regarding the anthrax investigation. [REDACTED] did not  
agree to take it, stating that [REDACTED] did not believe it was necessary.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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**Precedence:** ROUTINE

**Date:** 08/12/2003

**To:** Washington Field

**Attn:** IIC  
SSA  
SA

**From:** Washington Field

AMX 3

**Contact:**

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**Approved By:**

**Drafted By:**

**Case ID #:** 279A-WF-222936-POI (Pending)-921  
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 395

**Title:** AMERITHRAX;  
MAJOR CASE 184

**Synopsis:** Report results of elimination investigation to date  
regarding [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
social security account number [redacted]

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**Details:** [redacted] began employment with the United States Army  
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] was investigated in captioned investigation  
based upon [redacted] work with virulent Bacillus anthracis (Ba) in  
spore form and [redacted] access to the Ames strain of Ba. [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] work focused on [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] has not traveled to New Jersey and does not  
have any family or friends in the Princeton or Trenton, New  
Jersey area. [redacted] who resides in  
New Jersey.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 08/12/2003

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Reviews of [ ] financial records from 1999 thru 2001 revealed no connections to New Jersey.

A time line of [ ] activities for the likely time periods of the mailing of the anthrax letters from Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using USAMRIID security key card access records, home telephone toll records, credit card use, and personal bank account records (via cleared checks provided) and Fort Detrick motor-pool vehicle records. The time-line focused on any applicable six hour period for which [ ] would be unaccounted, with the premise that it takes approximately six hours to drive round trip from Frederick, Maryland to Princeton, New Jersey.

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Time-line First Mailing (5:00 p.m., 9/17/2001 through 8:00 p.m., 9/18/2001)

A review of [ ] USAMRIID key card access activity displays thirty (30) recorded accesses to building [ ] on 9/17/2001; the first entry "IN" at [ ] and the final exit "OUT" at [ ]

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A personal check from a [ ] account of [ ] and [ ] for "Cash", was negotiated at [ ] bank, [ ]. The check was endorsed on the reverse by [ ] signature and processed on 9/17/2001 at 4:48 p.m. for cash, as per the time/date stamp below the endorsement.

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There is a fifteen-hour and twenty-minute period from 4:48 p.m. 9/17/2001 until [ ] enters via "IN" access to building [ ] at USAMRIID at [ ] on 9/18/2001. No records were reviewed which can demonstrate [ ] whereabouts for the fifteen-hour twenty-minute period. [ ] stated in an interview that to the best of [ ] recollection, [ ] was home all night on 9/17/2001.

On [ ] entered "IN" building [ ] of USAMRIID and [ ] finally exited "OUT" of building [ ] at [ ] a Fort Detrick vehicle acquired by BRUCE IVINS at 7:42 a.m. as per motor-pool records, to [ ]. The vehicle was returned to Fort Detrick motor-pool at 3:42 p.m. on 9/18/2001.

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[ ] wrote a personal check, [ ] which was negotiated at the [ ] at [ ] on 9/18/2001 as per the [ ] endorsement stamp on the reverse side of the check.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 08/12/2003

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[redacted] made a long distance phone call on 9/18/2001 from [redacted] residence at 6:16 p.m. to [redacted] at [redacted] which lasted sixty-three minutes.

Time-Line Second Mailing (3:00 p.m., 10/6/2001 through 11:00 a.m., 10/9/2001)

[redacted] made a long distance phone from [redacted] residence on 10/6/2001 at 9:50 a.m. to [redacted] which lasted two minutes.

[redacted] wrote and negotiated a personal check at the [redacted] in [redacted] at 2:20 p.m. as per the endorsement stamp on the reverse side of the check.

[redacted] made a long distance phone call from [redacted] residence on 10/6/2001 at 2:47 p.m. to [redacted] in [redacted] which lasted four minutes.

[redacted] and [redacted] in the evening of [redacted] and [redacted] were at the [redacted] until late in the evening. No exact time was noted.

There is approximately a ten to twelve hour time period from the [redacted] on [redacted] during which no records were reviewed which can demonstrate [redacted] whereabouts until [redacted] at approximately [redacted] on 10/7/2001. [redacted] stated in an interview that [redacted] was with [redacted] that evening as far as [redacted] can recall.

An electronic attendance record from the [redacted] at [redacted] in [redacted] provided by [redacted] reports that [redacted] attended [redacted] that week.

There is approximately a forty-four-hour and nineteen-minute time period from approximately 10:00 a.m. on 10/7/2001 to 10/9/2001 at 7:19 a.m. during which no records were reviewed which can demonstrate [redacted] whereabouts. In separate interviews, [redacted] stated that as far as they could recall, [redacted] was at home during this time period (10/8/2001 being a holiday).

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A review of [redacted] USAMRIID key card access showed that [redacted] entered "IN" building [redacted] at [redacted] on 10/9/2001 and finally exited "OUT" at [redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 08/12/2003

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was given a polygraph examination on [redacted] which targeted any knowledge of or involvement in the anthrax mailings. The report of the polygraph examination states that no deception was indicated by [redacted] during the polygraph examination.

[redacted] handwriting was reviewed and compared to the writing on the anthrax-laced letters by handwriting experts on [redacted] Results of the comparisons were negative.

[redacted]

[redacted] has been interviewed several times and has cooperated fully with this investigation. [redacted] is aware of [redacted] and has been very helpful in identifying jointly used laboratory space and equipment as well as co-workers [redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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